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Script requests which are triggered by non-parser-inserted script elements are allowed. hash-source and nonce-source expressions will be honored. host-source and scheme-source expressions, as well as the "'unsafe-inline'" and "'self' keyword-sources will be ignored when loading script.Ģ. If present in a script-src or default-src directive, it has two main effects:ġ.
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The " 'strict-dynamic'" source expression aims to make Content Security Policy simpler to deploy for existing applications who have a high degree of confidence in the scripts they load directly, but low confidence in their ability to provide a reasonably secure whitelist. What’s strict-dynamic? Let’s look at the CSP spec itself: Obviously, at the same time it’s very hard to adopt and maintain such a CSP for a given application, especially if your dependencies change their code. If a feature is unsafe, it’s marked as so, together with the trust I put into all other origins - and that trust is not transitive. There are various quirks and bypasses with this type of CSP, but at least it’s explicit. Why so many sources? Well, if a certain script from, say loads a new script, it needs to be whitelisted too. Script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' Developers then had a way to use inline scripts in a safe fashion.
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Unless the attacker knew the nonce (or the reflection was in the body of a nonced script), their XSS payload would be stopped. From then on, script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'nonce-12345' would only allow inline scripts if the nonce attribute had a given value. Later on this was made secure again when nonces were introduced. If you’re opting out of security benefits, at least you’re aware of it. That’s why this new expression used the unsafe- prefix.
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Both enable XSS attacks by allowing code to be included directly in the document itself they are best avoided completely. In either case, developers SHOULD NOT include either 'unsafe-inline', or data: as valid sources in their policies. Introducing insecurity into a security feature to ease adoption is an interesting approach, but at least it’s documented: With it, it allowed the developers to use CSP without the security it provides (as now the attacker could again inject code through reflected XSS). And so ‘unsafe-inline’ source expression was created. Of course, this put a burden on application developers, as inline styles and scripts were prevalent back then - in the end almost noone used CSP. transitioning from spaghetti-code to MVC paradigms or separating the behavior from the view this was hip at that time). In addition to providing security benefits, it also encouraged refactoring the applications (e.g. The first attempt at solving this with CSP was then to move every JS snippet from HTML to a separate resource and disable inline script execution (as those are most likely XSS payloads reflected by the vulnerable application). When CSP was created, the XSS was mostly caused by reflecting user input in the response (reflected XSS).